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Many researchers are attempting to quantify or 
understand the value of information, especially for the 
Army as it enters its transformation.  Information can be 
decomposed into various qualities.  Three of these 
qualities, timeliness, accuracy, and completeness, form the 
basis for this thesis.  This thesis uses a simulation 
framework developed by the author to analyze the three 
components of information listed above.  The scenario 
selected is a typical vignette of an Objective Force 
company-sized element conducting offensive operations 
against threat elements.  Knowledge of the threat was 
compromised by the presence of decoy elements as well as 
previously damaged or killed systems (BDA).  In this 
scenario the fires are initiated from standoff ranges.  The 
initial and running assessments of the threat composition 
are made based on the information provided by sensors on 
board the unit’s organic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  
Analysis of the simulation results helps in understanding 
how components of information quality affect the overall 
effectiveness of the force as reflected in an efficiency 
measure.  Additionally, critical thresholds for timeliness, 
accuracy, and completeness of information are pinpointed to 
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The US Army and its Training and Doctrine Command have 
taken on the responsibility for determining how to trade 
heavy caliber weapons and heavy armor for lighter, more 
agile, and information-dependent fighting systems.  
Understanding the impact of how information enables the 
future Objective Force is critical in this high-risk 
endeavor.  A common criticism of information-based warfare 
is, “You can’t know an enemy to death.” 
There is a difference between the value and the 
quality of information.  Value is subjective and depends on 
the decision maker as well as his information needs.  
Battle command analysis focuses on information value to 
different levels of information users.  Information quality 
is more objective and is the focus of this research.   
Information quality is defined by its timeliness, 
accuracy and completeness.1   The overarching problem 
examined by this research is determining the relative 
influence these components of information quality have on 
combat outcomes. 
The methodology used to explore this problem consists 
of two major pieces.  The first step is the development of 
a simulation framework that models an Objective Force unit 
engaged in combat operations.  A Mounted Combat System 
(MCS) Company, one of the Unit of Action (UA) sub-elements, 
is the subject of the simulation tool.  The MCS Company is 
optimized for extended line of sight (LOS) with beyond line 
of sight (BLOS) fires, and employs chemical energy (CE) and 
                     
1 Perry, p. 30 
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kinetic energy (KE) munitions to engage at standoff.2  Its 
mission in the simulation model is to identify and 
eliminate enemy targets dispersed throughout an objective 
area using organic fires at standoff ranges.  The future 
threat, recognizing its overmatch by Objective Force units, 
will use adaptive tactics, deception, and physical decoys 
to their own advantage.  The simulation tool mirrors this 
operational environment with its ability to model decoys, 
stationary and moving live targets, and battlefield clutter 
in the form of battle damaged vehicles.  The simulation 
also models the three organic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV 
CL II) that are used to provide the BDA and target location 
data.    
The second step is performing statistical analysis on 
the simulation output.  This facilitates making 
observations about information quality component 
relationships and how they impact force effectiveness as 
reflected in an efficiency measure.  A 33 full factorial 
designed experiment is used to structure the simulation 
responses by looking at timeliness, accuracy, and 
completeness each at three levels. The response for each 
design point of the experiment is the number of rounds 
required to eliminate a pre-determined percentage of enemy 
targets.  Analysis of variance, polynomial regression and 
data correlation are used to make broad observations about 
the dynamics of these information quality components. 
The results of this study show that timeliness, 
accuracy, and completeness are significant in influencing 
the measure of effectiveness, but there is a difference in 
                     
2 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90/O&O, p. 3-23 
  xvii
their relative importance with regard to how much of the 
variability in the response each component can explain.  In 
this scenario, the completeness factor explains 31% of the 
variability while accuracy and timeliness explain 23% and 
12% respectively.  Completeness stands out with respect to 
the importance of a single factor.   
Additionally, some components produce accelerated 
changes in the MOE compared to the degree of change in the 
level of the factor.  Increasing the timeliness factor 
level from medium to high results in tremendous 
improvements in efficiency while a change from medium to 
low results in only a small decrease in efficiency.  
However, increasing the completeness factor level from 
medium to high results in a mild increase in efficiency 
while a change from medium to low results in a 
significantly large decrease in efficiency.      
Finally, there is a synergistic effect when the 
combination of timeliness and accuracy are held at their 
high levels.  Three of the top five simulation run 
responses occur when this is the case.  Timeliness and 
accuracy combine in a way that is resilient to the effect 
of completeness.   
These dynamics are certainly scenario specific, but 
this study demonstrates that they do exist and provides a 
methodology and framework with which to discover them.  
This information in the hands of a concept developer allows 
him to make wise choices in determining what technologies 
and tactics are needed to improve the success of units 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Army’s new Objective Force design calls for a 
new paradigm in fighting our future battles.  Objective 
Force units are anticipated to have the capability to “see 
first, understand first, act first and finish decisively.”3  
The key to making this concept a reality is an overwhelming 
situational understanding largely made possible by the 
ability to obtain, process and rapidly move an abundance of 
information on the future battlefield.   
The traditional elements of combat power include 
Maneuver, Firepower, Protection and Leadership resulting in 
the formula: CP=M+F+P+L.  According to Army concept 
developers, however, it is envisioned that in Objective 
Force units a “situational understanding derived from real-
time, accurate Information raises combat power 
exponentially: CP=(M+F+P+L)Information.”4 
One example of the impact of information, consistent 
with the idea expressed in the above formula, is an 
observation by VADM(ret.) Cebrowski in Transformation 
Trends: “The air force says that a target once requiring 
1,000 bombs to destroy now requires only one.  That 
magnitude of change is owed almost entirely to information 
technology and processes.”5   
 
    
                     
3 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90/O&O, p. 4-3  
4 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90/O&O, p. 3-1 
5 Cebrowski, p. 2 
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B. PROBLEM 
In this day and age there is a lot of emphasis on the 
merits of information, and much effort is going into how it 
can be obtained more quickly, completely and accurately.  
However, “little has been done to establish a clear 
relationship between information and the outcome of 
military operations.”6   The first step in attempting to 
discern what this relationship looks like is defining what 
is meant by the term information.  
According to Dr. Walter L. Perry in his article, 
“Knowledge and Combat Outcomes,” information has two main 
attributes: value and quality.7  Information has value if it 
informs the commander and answers questions posed by his 
intelligence requirements such as Priority Intelligence 
Requirements (PIR) or Commanders Critical Information 
Requirements (CCIR).  In other words, valuable information 
is relevant to the situation at hand.   
The quality of information, however, depends on its 
accuracy, timeliness and completeness.8  Valuable 
information may not always be of high quality.  On the 
other hand, information could have high quality but have no 
relevance to the situation at hand, and therefore have 
little to no value.    
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the 
impact of information on Objective Force operations.  The 
focus will be on information quality, as defined by Perry 
above, and the goal is to draw some broad conclusions about 
                     
6 Darilek, p. 2 
7 Perry, p. 30 
8 Perry, p. 30 
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how the individual components of information quality can 
influence combat outcomes.  
A specific analysis of information timeliness, 
accuracy, and completeness and their impact on a combat 
scenario does not yet exist.  These three terms were 
discussed in a Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint 
Feasibility Study Report in September 2000.9  However, in 
this report they were used as measures of effectiveness to 
evaluate mobile target vs. fixed target battle damage 
assessment (BDA) processes, not inputs to the problem.   
C.   METHODOLOGY 
Under the Objective Force concept, the Unit of Action 
(UA) takes on a role similar to that of the traditional 
maneuver brigade.  There are many critical tasks that must 
be done with a high level of precision by the UA, such as 
firing and maneuvering under contact, delivering fires at 
standoff, and assuring mobility near the objective.10  An 
additional critical task is tracking and evaluating Battle 
Damage Assessment (BDA).  Accurate BDA facilitates at least 
two things: (1) decisive action by the commander so he 
knows when he can transition to subsequent actions and 
maintain pressure on the enemy, and (2) efficient 
expenditure of limited munitions.11  
For this thesis, a simulation model called the Mounted 
Combat System Killing Machine (MCSKM) was developed.  The 
simulation treats BDA, target type and target location as 
the types of information under observation.  With a focus 
                     
9 Joint Battle Damage Assessment Feasibility Report, p. 2-3 
10 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90/O&O, p. 4-4 
11 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90/O&O, p. 4-13 
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on efficient expenditure of munitions, the model measures 
the impact of this information gain on the results of a 
specific scenario.   
A Mounted Combat System (MCS) Company, one of the UA 
sub-elements, is the subject of the simulation.  It is 
optimized for extended line of sight (LOS) with beyond line 
of sight (BLOS) fires, and employs chemical energy (CE) and 
kinetic energy (KE) munitions to engage at standoff.12  Its 
mission in the simulation model is to identify and 
eliminate targets dispersed throughout an objective area 
using organic fires at standoff ranges.  The MCS Company 
has a total of 10 MCS weapon platforms available to engage 
targets as shown in figure 1 below.  This unit also has 
three organic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV CL II) that are 
part of its table of organization and equipment (TOE) as 
shown in figure 2 below.  These UAVs are used to provide 











                     
12 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90/O&O, p. 3-23 
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Figure 2.   MCS Company Organization 
 
The components of timeliness, accuracy and 
completeness of the information captured on the ground are 
varied and the resulting impact on the number of munitions 
it takes to eliminate a certain percentage of the live 
targets is measured.  Listed below are the definitions of 
these information quality components and how they are 
represented in the MCSKM.  
1. Timeliness       
Timeliness reflects the relationship between the age 
of an information item and the tasks or missions it must 
37 TOE Personnel
10   Mounted Combat Systems (MCS)
1   C2V
3   ARV-RSTAs (6 Ton Variant)
1   FTTS-U (C2)
3   UAV CL II L/C Units
3 UAV CL II Aerial Vehicles
37 TOE Personnel
10   Mounted Co bat Syste s ( CS)
1   C2V
3   ARV-RSTAs (6 Ton Variant)
1   FTTS-U (C2)
3   UAV CL II L/C Units
3 UAV CL II Aerial Vehicles
Mounted Combat System Company   
Mounted Combat System Company X 2
9 TOE Personnel
3   MCS
1   ARV-RSTAs





1   C2V
1   MCS
1 FTTS-U (C2)
3   UAV CL II L/C Units
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support.13  In the MCSKM, the timeliness factor represents 
the amount of time it takes from the detection of a target 
to the impact of a round on the target.  The processes 
imbedded in this factor are the UAV data transmission time, 
man/machine image processing time, firing decision time and 
the round time of flight.  Essentially this is the time it 
takes for raw data to become actionable information 
combined with the time to complete the resulting action. 
2. Accuracy 
Accuracy is a measure of how faithfully the items of 
information represent the realities they describe.14  In the 
MCSKM, accuracy is represented by the conditional 
probability of classification given that one of the three 
battlefield entities is present.  This is the probability 
that a live target, dead target or decoy will be classified 
as such given that it was detected.  In the MCSKM, if an 
entity is present in the area being searched it will be 
detected with a probability of 1.0 for the sake of 
simplicity.  Therefore, accuracy is purely a function of 
the quality of the classification process. 
3. Completeness 
Completeness describes the level to which all the 
relevant items of information are available including 
entities (such as targets), attributes (such as movement) 
and the relationships between them.15  In the MCSKM, the 
amount of area on the ground a UAV can observe and evaluate 
for the presence of targets in a given unit of time 
represents completeness of information. 
                     
13 Alberts, p. 85 
14 Alberts, p. 84 
15 Alberts, p. 84 
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II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. SCENARIO 
The objective area for the MCSKM scenario is an 8 
kilometer by 8 kilometer box of primarily open, rolling 
terrain.  The  MCS Company is located in an attack by fire 
position and, with standoff range firing capability, 
destroys targets in the targeted area of interest (TAI) in 
support of a follow-on assault by an adjacent infantry 
company.  
   
Figure 3.   Scenario Environment 
Targets are randomly and uniformly dispersed 
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and they are broken down into three types with the 
following distribution: 36 live, 7 dead and 7 decoy.  Half 
of the live targets are specified as movers and will move 
randomly until killed by a munition fired from an MCS 
weapon platform.  Stationary targets represent systems 
conducting a static defense, command posts, air defense 
assets, or other fixed sites.  Dead targets are systems 
that are previously damaged or killed.  Decoys are non-
moving entities that have no military significance but can 
be mistaken for valid, live targets.  See table 1 for 
target summary: 
   
Table 1.   Distribution of Target Types 
 
Three organic UAVs fly in a random pattern and report 
perceived target imagery to the analysts in the command 
post.  This target imagery serves as the sole basis for 
target location and target type.  With this information a 
decision will be made to fire or not fire at a target.  
There are no other reconnaissance assets in the area of 
influence except what gets transmitted via the UAVs. 
If a target is perceived as live then a decision to 
fire at that target is made.  The end state is achieved 
when 80% of the live targets are destroyed.  It is 
important to note that the values chosen for this scenario 
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B.   GENERAL MODEL 
The Mounted Combat System Killing Machine (MCSKM) is a 
discrete-event simulation written in the JAVA programming 
language.  The MCSKM implements the simulation tool Simkit, 
a discrete-event simulation package developed and 
maintained by Research Assistant Professor Arnold H. Buss 
of the Naval Postgraduate School.  The objective of the 
MCSKM is to provide a framework to explore the information 
quality components of timeliness, accuracy and completeness 
and how these factors influence the number of munitions 
required to kill a certain percentage of the targets.  
Table 2 below shows all of the available parameter 
adjustments that can be made by the user.  Experimentation 
was done with all of these settings in determining the 
right mix for the final experiment.  These excursions will 
be discussed in Chapter IV.  For the analysis in this 
thesis, the bold settings remained fixed while the 
remaining settings were varied in the experiment described 
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Table 2.   MCSKM Available Adjustable Parameters 
 
The MCSKM is comprised of two basic processes: a UAV 
process and a shooting process.  Both of these processes 
will be explained in detail in the next section.  In 
general, a UAV process is instantiated (i.e., created in 
the software) for each UAV represented in the model.  In 
this model there are three UAV processes in place.  There 
is only one shooting process in place and it “listens” to 
each UAV process in order to track individual UAV movements 
and locations.  Figure 4 below displays this listening 
relationship. 
Simulation Factors Description Good Value Medium Value Low Value
probability of detection probability of detecting a target (live, dead or decoy) 1.0
probability of false detection probability of detecting a live target when no targets of any type are present (type II error) 0.0
probability of determination                   
(perceived | actual)
probability of determining what a target is once 
detected
     p(live | live) 0.8 0.6 0.4
     p(dead | live) 0.1 0.2 0.3
     p(decoy | live) 0.1 0.2 0.3
     p(live | dead) 0.1 0.2 0.3
     p(dead | dead) 0.8 0.6 0.4
     p(decoy | dead) 0.1 0.2 0.3
     p(live | decoy) 0.1 0.2 0.3
     p(dead | decoy) 0.1 0.2 0.3
     p(decoy | decoy) 0.8 0.6 0.6
processing time
process = UAV glimpse trasmission time + 
man/machine image processing time  +              
firing decision time + round time of flight              
10 sec 30 sec 60 sec
UAV transmission interval seconds between UAV transmissions 5
Number of UAVs
How many simultaneous randomly searching 
UAVs in the air - should be three based on the 
Nov 02 FCS O&O
3
box size how much area a UAV can see in a singe 
glimpse (single dimension of box in meters)
400 200 100



















bold = held fixed in simulation
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Figure 4.   MCSKM Listening Scheme 
 
While each UAV process controls the UAV movement, the 
shooting process does all of the real work in the model.  
The shooting process manages all target movements, target 
classifications, target state changes, firing delays and 
kill adjudications. 
C.   INITIALIZATION 
At the beginning of each run of the MCSKM, all targets 
are given an exact grid location based on the 8 kilometers 
by 8 kilometers objective area.  These locations are 
random, uniformly distributed and given in terms of meters.  
For example, the lower left corner of the objective area 
would be grid location (0.0, 0.0) and a target that is 5 
kilometers to the right of the origin and 3 kilometers up 
would be at grid location (5000, 3000).  For the 50% of the 
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assigned an initial random azimuth [0,2 ]π  to begin movement 
as well.   
The UAV locations are represented differently from the 
targets.  Based on the size of the box representing how 
much area a UAV can see in a single glimpse, the objective 
area is divided up into grids of the same dimension.  For 
example, if the box size representing how much a UAV can 
monitor on the ground is 400 meters by 400 meters for a 
given run, then the objective area is divided into a 20 by 
20 grid system (8000m/400m = 20, the number of grids on 
each axis).  Movement will be described later, but each UAV 
will have a random starting location in one of these grids 
for each run of the MCSKM.  Figure 5 below demonstrates 
starting locations of (5, 5), (10, 15) and (18, 10) for the 
three UAVS as an example.   
Figure 5.   UAV Starting Locations in AI 
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D.   UAV PROCESS 
Movement of a single UAV is simulated by “looking” at 
one particular grid square for the amount of time it would 
take the UAV to move across the grid square in a linear 
fashion at a fixed speed.  For example, if UAV speed = 120 
km/h and the grid square is 400m x 400m then the time in 
grid = (400m)/(120 km/h) = 12 seconds.  The choice to move 
from one grid square to another instead of tracing out a 
precise path along exact coordinates was made for the sake 
of simplicity in programming.  To travel 400m in 12 seconds 
with a sensor sweep width of 400m is roughly equivalent to 
occupying a 400m by 400m grid square for 12 seconds.  
Although some precision is lost in the case of a diagonal 
move, it is not a great concern in light of the fact that 
the UAV movement is already abstracted.     
After this time has passed the UAV “moves” to an 
adjacent grid square in a random manner.  The UAV can move 
into any one of the eight adjacent grid squares but it 
cannot remain stationary.  If the UAV is on the border of 
the AI it is not allowed to move in any direction that 
would take it outside of the AI.  The footprint of what the 
UAV can see (have the potential to detect and classify) on 
the ground is represented by the size of the grid square.   
This is the part of the model where completeness plays 
its role.  The size of the grid square and the speed of the 
UAV, in conjunction with each other, control the amount of 
information available per period of time.  With 12 seconds 
time on station for any size grid square, the completeness 
levels are determined by the following parameter value 
combinations: 
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Table 3.   Completeness Levels 
 
Figure 6 below is an event graph of the UAV Process.  
The RUN event initializes the UAV in a random starting 
location and schedules the first arrival in a grid square.  
Upon arrival, the “UAV Depart Grid” is scheduled for when 
the time in the grid will have elapsed and a “Determine 
Targets” is scheduled immediately which is the UAV’s first 
attempt to detect and classify any targets present.  The 
UAV process only signals for the “Determine Targets” event 
to happen; the actual work of this event is done in the 
shooting process and will be explained later.  After 
arrival in the grid and taking an initial glimpse, the UAV 
will continue to attempt to determine targets by taking a 
glimpse at 5-second intervals until its time in the grid 
has expired.  Once the time is up it will move to another 
grid in the manner explained above. 
High Medium Low
UAV Speed 120 km/h 60 km/h 30 km/h
Grid Size 400m 200m 100m
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Figure 6.   UAV Process Event Graph 
 
E.  SHOOTING PROCESS 
 The Shooting Process is initiated by any UAV 
Process’s call for a “Determine Targets” event.  The model 
contains variables for the probability of false detection 
(type II error), the probability of detection, and the 
conditional probability of classification given a 
detection.  However, the probability of false detection was 
fixed at 0.0 and the probability of detection was fixed at 
1.0 for the sake of simplicity in this implementation of 
the MCSKM.  The reasoning for these choices is explained in 
chapter IV.  Therefore, if a target is present it will be 
detected.  Once detection occurs, the UAV will classify the 













(SimTime < ArriveTime + Tg)
{ArriveTime = SimTime}{GridI = random grid
Gridj = random grid} {GridI +=1, -=1, or same
Gridj +=1, -=1, or same}
Parameters State Variables
tg – time in grid gridI – grid number in X orientation
ti – time between glimpses gridJ – grid number in Y orientation
arriveTime – time of arrival in grid
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classification parameter setting.  If a target is detected 
and classified as live, then a decision to fire is made. 
The impact of the round will be delayed by a number of 
seconds based on the processing time parameter.  This 
simulates the time it takes for raw data to become 
actionable information and then be acted upon.  Once a 
target is identified as live and has a round fired at it, 
that target is not eligible for detection again until that 
round has landed. This prevents multiple rounds being fired 
at the same live target in a single grid square.  Since 
half of the live targets are moving, there is always a 
chance that the original target may not be in the same grid 
when the round makes impact. 
This process keeps iterating until a specified target 
attrition level is achieved.  This level is variable in the 
MCSKM but for this analysis the attrition level is 80% of 
the instantiated live targets as requested by the scenario 
under observation.  The implications of changing this 
threshold are discussed in chapter IV.  The simulation 
terminates once that attrition level is met.  The measure 
of effectiveness for a given run is the number of munitions 
required to reach the specified level of attrition.  
Figure 7 below is an event graph of the Shooting 
Process.  Since this is where the bulk of the simulation 
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Figure 7.   Shooting Process Event Graph 
  
1. “Determine Targets” Event 
The “Determine Targets” event in the Shooting Process 
is scheduled by the “Determine Targets” event in the UAV 
Process.  The Shooting Process knows when to conduct this 
event because it “listens” to the UAV Processes.  The UAV 
Process passes its grid location so that the Shooting 
Process knows where to look for targets.  
a.  Target Movement  
Since some of the live targets are movers, their 
locations are updated first.  Moving targets move at a 
fixed speed for a fixed duration in a linear fashion before 
they stop and change direction.  The speed and move 
duration are both variable but in this analysis they are 
held constant at 27 km/h and 80 seconds respectively.  At 
the end of a target’s move, a new azimuth is generated 
























ID any target perceived live}
Parameters State Variables
tp – time to process data munitions – number of MCS munitions fired
pc – p(perceived|actual) liveTargets – number of live targets remaining
(target is perceived live in grid I,J)
Target
UAV, TargetUAV, Target




check for original target,
check if target was live}
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that will lead a target out of the objective area by the 
end of its move segment are not allowed.  Figure 8 below 
shows one possibility for three consecutive target moves. 
 
Figure 8.   Target Movement Example 
 
b.  Target Classification 
Once target location adjustments are made for the 
movers, the list of Target objects is iterated through to 
determine which targets are in the current grid of 
interest.  Targets that are located in the grid are pulled 
from the master target list and added to a separate 
candidate list.  The candidate list is then iterated 
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decoy based on the conditional probability of 
classification. 
This is the part of the model where accuracy 
plays its role.  The probability of classification given a 
detection directly affects the quality of a target 
classification.  The accuracy levels are determined by the 
following sets of parameter settings provided by the 
sponsor: 
Table 4.   Accuracy Levels 
 
For example, if the current target under 
evaluation is actually dead and the p(target is perceived 
live|target is actually dead) = .2, then there is a 20% 
chance that this target will be misclassified as live.  
Targets that are classified as dead or decoy are returned 
to the master target list.  However, any target that is 
classified as live is sent to the “Fire At Target” event as 
one of the parameters.  The other parameter sent to the 
“Fire At Target” event is the location of the UAV when this 
target was detected and classified. 
c.  Target Management       
Once a target is perceived (or classified) as 
live it does not go back into the master target list until 
probability of classification (perceived | actual) High Medium Low
p(live | live) 0.8 0.6 0.4
p(dead | live) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(decoy | live) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(live | dead) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(dead | dead) 0.8 0.6 0.4
p(decoy | dead) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(live | decoy) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(dead | decoy) 0.1 0.2 0.3
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later in the process.  The reason for this is because the 
same UAV will make multiple glimpses in the same grid 
before it moves to the next grid.  If it has the 
opportunity to reclassify the same target again as live on 
a subsequent glimpse, then another munition gets called in 
on the same target and the overall number of rounds to kill 
the targets at the end of the simulation becomes abnormally 
high.  When the “Determine Targets” event iterates through 
the master target list, if a target is identified as live 
it will not be available for detection and classification 
again until after the round designated for it has landed. 
2.  “Fire At Target” Event 
The “Fire At Target” event is simple in what it does, 
but it is symbolically very important.  This event does not 
take place until after the processing time, which started 
at detection, has elapsed.  Since some of the live targets 
are movers, there is always a chance that the original 
target that prompted the firing of a round may not be in 
the grid when the round lands.   
This is the part of the model where timeliness plays 
its role.  The actual values used for the level of 
timeliness in the model come from a normal distribution 
with parameters listed in the following table: 
 
Table 5.   Timeliness Levels 
 
The parameters passed in from the “Determine Targets” 
event, the target and UAV location, are simply carried 
High Medium Low
mean 10 sec 30 sec 60 sec
std dev 1 sec 3 sec 6 sec
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along and passed on to the next event.  The “Fire At 
Target” event does not do anything with these parameters.  
The purpose of this event is to record the expenditure of a 
munition and immediately schedule an “Assess Target Damage” 
event.  Technically there would be a time of flight for the 
round that would take place after the firing event.  
However, that time is accounted for as one of the 
components of the aggregated total processing time leading 
up to the “Fire At Target” event.  Therefore the “Assess 
Target Damage” event is immediately scheduled with a delay 
of 0.0 seconds.  
3.  “Assess Target Damage” Event 
At this point the munition that was scheduled to be 
fired (when a target was perceived live back in the 
“Determine Targets” event) is now about to land.  The 
target that was passed in to this event as a parameter from 
the “Fire At Target” event is now placed back in the master 
target list.   
a. Target Movement 
As in the “Determine Targets” event, moving 
target locations must be updated.  This happens right 
before the strike of the round and right after the target 
triggering the firing event is placed back in the master 
target list.  This gives the target that has been held out 
of the list a chance to update its location before the 
round selects a target. 
b. Target Selection  
The UAV parameter that gets passed in to this 
event contains the grid location of the UAV when the 
original target was detected and classified.  The target 
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list is iterated through and a new candidate list is built 
consisting of targets that are currently located in the 
grid.  The candidate list is then iterated through in order 
to find the original target.  If the original target is 
found then that is the target the round hits.  If the 
original target is not found, but there are other targets 
in the candidate list, then a target is randomly chosen 
from the list to be hit by the round.  Once a target is 
taken from the candidate list to be hit by the round, all 
other targets are returned to the master target list.  If 
no targets are in the candidate list, then the round 
becomes wasted.   
There are a few important notes regarding the 
accuracy of the munition.  As depicted in figure 9, it is 
envisioned that Objective Force units conducting beyond 
line of sight (BLOS) fire missions will be utilizing an 
extended-range precision-guided munition effective out to 
12 kilometers.16  Since the MCS Company in the simulation 
model is conducting BLOS fire missions at maximum ranges 
from 8-12 kilometers, when a round is fired into a grid it 
will kill any target in that grid with a probability of 
1.0.  This seems consistent with the technical vision for 
BLOS munition capability in the Objective Force.   
 
 
                     
16 National Defense Industrial Association 2001 Munitions Executive 
Summit 10-12. 
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Figure 9.   Objective Force Fire Missions 
 
As a convention in the MCSKM, the BLOS round will 
always seek first the target it was aimed at and kill it if 
present.  However, if the original target is not in the 
grid the round will randomly choose another target in the 
same grid and kill it.  
If the target chosen by the round is actually 
already dead or a decoy, even though it was perceived live, 
that target is simply returned to the master target list 
and available for detection again.  If the target chosen by 
the round is actually live, then that target is passed as a 
parameter to the “Change Target State” event with a delay 
of 0.0 seconds. 
4.   “Change Target State” Event 
The “Change Target State” event makes some changes to 
the Target object that is passed in.  First it changes the 
target state from live to dead.  Then, in case the target 
was a mover, it ensures that the moving attribute is set to 
false.  Finally, the number of live targets remaining is 
decreased by one.  It is at this event that the MCSKM 
terminates once the pre-established threshold for the 
number of killed targets is met. 
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5.  MOE Explanation 
When it comes to resource allocation, there is a 
tension between effectiveness and efficiency.17  The mission 
must get accomplished so effectiveness is of primary 
importance.  However, if there are multiple ways of 
accomplishing the mission, the most efficient one with 
regards to expenditure of resources is preferred.   
By design, the MCSKM will eventually accomplish the 
mission.  Since all targets are at standoff ranges, there 
is no threat of return fire.  If the model runs long 
enough, no matter how bad the information quality is, the 
MCS Company will eventually get the enemy down to the 
desired attrition level.  Therefore, the question becomes 
how efficiently this can be done.  That is why the number 
of munitions fired is the chosen measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) to determine the relative importance of information 
timeliness, accuracy, and completeness for this simulation.     
 
                     
17 FM 6-0, p. 2-26 
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III. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
A.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The experimental design implemented for analysis of 
the Mounted Combat System Killing Machine (MCSKM) is a 3k 
factorial design, with k set at 3, meaning there are 3 
factors under observation each at three levels.18  In this 
case, the three factors are timeliness, accuracy and 
completeness.  The levels for each factor are represented 
by coded variables as such: high = 1, medium = 0, low = -1.  
With three factors at three levels each, there are a total 
of 27 design points.  The following table displays the 
complete design: 
Table 6.   33 Factorial Experimental Design 
                     
18 Montgomery, p. 281 
Design Point Completeness level Accuracy level Timeliness level
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 0
3 1 1 -1
4 1 0 1
5 1 0 0
6 1 0 -1
7 1 -1 1
8 1 -1 0
9 1 -1 -1
10 0 1 1
11 0 1 0
12 0 1 -1
13 0 0 1
14 0 0 0
15 0 0 -1
16 0 -1 1
17 0 -1 0
18 0 -1 -1
19 -1 1 1
20 -1 1 0
21 -1 1 -1
22 -1 0 1
23 -1 0 0
24 -1 0 -1
25 -1 -1 1
26 -1 -1 0
27 -1 -1 -1
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The tables below show specifically what values are 
used for each of the three factors and their three levels: 
 
Table 7.   Actual Values for Timeliness  
 
Table 8.   Actual Values for Completeness 
 
 
Table 9.   Actual Values for Accuracy 
 
 
B.  EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
For the run of the full experiment, input parameter 
values were used that correspond to the three levels of 
timeliness, accuracy, and completeness given in the tables 
above.  The individual parameters were changed in groups, 
as opposed to individually, based on how each of the three 
main factors have been defined for this research.  Each 
design point represents a unique combination of factor 
settings.  The response for each design point represents 
High(+1) Medium(0) Low(-1)
mean 10 sec 30 sec 60 sec
std dev 1 sec 3 sec 6 sec
High(+1) Medium(0) Low(-1)
UAV Speed 120 km/h 60 km/h 30 km/h
Grid Size 400m 200m 100m
probability of classification (perceived | actual) High(+1) Medium(0) Low(-1)
p(live | live) 0.8 0.6 0.4
p(dead | live) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(decoy | live) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(live | dead) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(dead | dead) 0.8 0.6 0.4
p(decoy | dead) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(live | decoy) 0.1 0.2 0.3
p(dead | decoy) 0.1 0.2 0.3
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the number of munitions fired from the entire collection of 
MCS weapon platforms to kill 80% of the live targets.  For 
each design point 100 replications of the MCSKM were run 
and the mean response for each design point is listed in 
the table below: 
 
Table 10.   Experiment Summary with Means 
 
 
1. Model Verification 
At a glance, the results seem to meet some common-
sense expectations.  The high level settings for each of 
timeliness, accuracy and completeness produce the best MOE 
Design Point Completeness level Accuracy level Timeliness level Munitions
1 1 1 1 71.23
2 1 1 0 81.33
3 1 1 -1 99.92
4 1 0 1 106.38
5 1 0 0 112.72
6 1 0 -1 133.88
7 1 -1 1 143.23
8 1 -1 0 156.94
9 1 -1 -1 170.57
10 0 1 1 81.6
11 0 1 0 137.01
12 0 1 -1 142.16
13 0 0 1 121.23
14 0 0 0 188.77
15 0 0 -1 204.82
16 0 -1 1 161.13
17 0 -1 0 251.8
18 0 -1 -1 248.87
19 -1 1 1 104.42
20 -1 1 0 209.87
21 -1 1 -1 201.38
22 -1 0 1 154.83
23 -1 0 0 279.99
24 -1 0 -1 284.39
25 -1 -1 1 214.07
26 -1 -1 0 382.96
27 -1 -1 -1 346.58
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of 71.23 munitions.  Likewise, the low level settings for 
each of timeliness, accuracy and completeness produce 
nearly the worst MOE of 346.58 munitions.  The table below 
shows the mean responses for all factor levels, evaluated 
one factor at a time: 
 
Table 11.    Mean Responses for each Factor 
 
Again, intuition is confirmed by the above results.  
One would expect the MOE to get worse as the level settings 
for each factor vary from high to low.  According to Law 
and Kelton, an indicator that a simulation is working 
properly is that it produces reasonable output when run 
under a variety of settings of the input parameters.19   
There is ample evidence to suggest that the MCSKM 
works properly.  As described above, the results meet a 
basic level of validity as far as the directional effects 
one would expect to see given the different parameter 
settings.  Also, a detailed trace on the execution of the 
model was conducted by the author, stepping through the 
MCSKM event by event.  All locations were plotted by hand 
and state variables were tracked externally to the 
simulation.  Finally, subject matter experts at TRAC-
Monterey concurred with the results and agreed they were 
consistent with the parameter settings chosen.  
   
                     
19 Law & Kelton, p. 270 
Timeliness mean Accuracy mean Completeness mean
1 128.68 1 125.44 1 119.58
0 200.15 0 176.33 0 170.82
-1 203.62 -1 230.68 -1 242.05
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2.  Determining Factor Significance 
With a model that has produced some meaningful output, 
the task becomes determining the significance of the 
information quality components.  How important is each 
factor and how much does each factor influence the number 
of munitions fired? 
a. Analysis of Variance 
The first step in answering these questions is to 
look at the results of a three-factor analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).  The table below (computed in the S-PLUS 
statistical software package) displays timeliness, accuracy 
and completeness as the sources of variation along with all 
possible interactions: 
 
Table 12.   Analysis of Variance for MCSKM Munitions 
Fired 
 
It can be seen that all factors and interactions 
are statistically significant even at the α =.001 level.  In 
other words, all sources of variation listed above affect 
the number of munitions fired.  
b. Polynomial Regression 
Even though all factors and interactions are 







Square F Value P Value
Completeness 2 6810180 3405090 1761.3 0.0000
Accuracy 2 4986478 2493239 1289.6 0.0000
Timeliness 2 3220931 1610465 833.0 0.0000
Completeness:Accuracy 4 374358 93589 48.4 0.0000
Completeness:Timeliness 4 1230365 307591 159.1 0.0000
Accuracy:Timeliness 4 112753 28188 14.6 0.0000
Completeness:Accuracy:Timeliness 8 56096 7012 3.6 0.0003
Residuals 2673 5167669 1933
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importance in determining the number of munitions fired.  
In order to gain insight into this aspect of the analysis, 
a complete second order regression model was fit to the 
data.  The two-way interactions are important in order to 
gain insight about how factor combinations perform.  The 
squared terms are important to have in the model in order 
to check for non-linear factor behavior.  The value used 
for each factor was the number corresponding to the level 
setting (1, 0, -1) instead of the actual value used in the 
simulation.  All replications were used in building the 
regression model.  There are 27 design points and 100 
replications for each design point for a total of 2700 data 
points.  The regression model was fit using Excel’s 
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Table 13.   Polynomial Regression Model of MCSKM 
Response 
 
The intercept alone represents the predicted 
response when all levels are at their medium level (0).  
The other terms in the model come into play when the level 
of a factor changes to high (+1) or low(-1).  With an R-
Square value of .731, this regression model accounts for a 
significant amount of the variation in the MCSKM output 
data.  The graphs below depict the relationship between the 
regression model predictions and the actual simulation 











df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 9 16047867.76 1783096.42 811.46 0.00
Residual 2690 5910962.58 2197.38
Total 2699 21958830.35
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 192.34 2.39 80.58 0.00 187.66 197.02
Completeness -61.24 1.10 -55.43 0.00 -63.40 -59.07
Accuracy -52.62 1.10 -47.63 0.00 -54.79 -50.46
Timeliness -37.47 1.10 -33.91 0.00 -39.64 -35.30
Completeness2 10.00 1.91 5.22 0.00 6.24 13.75
Accuracy2 1.73 1.91 0.90 0.37 -2.03 5.48
Timeliness2 -34.01 1.91 -17.77 0.00 -37.76 -30.25
Completeness:Accuracy 17.47 1.35 12.91 0.00 14.82 20.13
Completeness:Timeliness 22.96 1.35 16.97 0.00 20.30 25.61
Accuracy:Timeliness 5.12 1.35 3.78 0.00 2.46 7.77
Regression Statistics
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Figure 11.   Residuals vs. Predictions of Munitions 
Fired 
 
Since the polynomial regression model captures 
the essence of the simulation model output, we can use the 
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regression model to make some general observations about 
the way timeliness, accuracy, and completeness behave in 
this simulation. 
All terms in the regression model are significant 
at the α =0.001 level except for the [accuracy]2 term.  Not 
only is the p-value for [accuracy]2 large, but the 
coefficient is quite small so it has little impact on the 
response.  These two things are indicators that the effect 
of accuracy on the response is essentially linear according 
to our coding.   
However, the effects of timeliness and 
completeness are not linear.  First, consider what happens 
to the response when all factors are at the medium level 
and timeliness alone is varied.   These changes are 
reflected in table 14 below:   
  
Table 14.   Changing Timeliness Alone from Medium 
Level 
 
If timeliness is increased to its high level 
(setting of 1) the number of munitions goes down by 71.5  
(-37.5 – 34) munitions.  But if the level of timeliness is 
decreased to its low level (setting of –1) the number of 
munitions goes up by only 3.5 (37.5 –34).  This is clearly 
not linear behavior and having the squared term in the 
regression model captures this dynamic.  The bigger 
resulting change from the medium setting is in the 
Intercept Completeness Accuracy Timeliness C2 A2 T2 CA CT AT Munitions
settings: 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
values: 192.3 -37.5 -34 =120.8
settings: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
values: 192.3 =192.3
settings: 0 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0
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direction of decreasing the number of munitions fired in 
spite of the fact that going from the middle level to the 
high level (30 sec to 10 sec) is a shorter step than going 
from the middle level to the low level (30 sec to 60 sec).      
On the other hand, the same procedure applied to 
the completeness factor indicates the opposite effect.  
Table 15 below shows what happens when completeness levels 
are changed in both directions from the medium level: 
 
Table 15.   Changing Completeness Alone from Medium 
Level 
 
If completeness is increased to its high level 
(setting of 1) the number of munitions goes down by 51.2  
(-61.2 + 10.0) munitions.  But if the level of completeness 
is decreased to its low level (setting of –1) the number of 
munitions goes up by 71.2 (61.2 + 10.0).  This is clearly 
not linear behavior.  However, the bigger change from the 
medium level setting is in the direction of increasing the 
number of munitions fired in spite of the fact that going 
from the middle level to the low level 200m grid to 100m 
grid) is a shorter step than going from the middle level to 
the high level (200m grid to 400m grid). 
By contrast, since the [accuracy]2  term 
coefficient is so small (1.7), it would have little effect 
on  the linearity  of  accuracy  if  we  applied  the  same 
Intercept Completeness Accuracy Timeliness C2 A2 T2 CA CT AT Munitions
settings: 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
values: 192.3 -61.2 10.0 =141.1
settings: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
values: 192.3 =192.3
settings: -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
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procedure again.  The response would essentially change by 
±  52.6 rounds, the accuracy term coefficient, which is 
linear behavior.   
These findings can help prioritize the 
expenditure of resources based on different goals.  If the 
intent is to guard against losing capability, the area of 
information completeness should be a maintenance priority 
since this analysis suggests a small drop in this factor 
level translates into accelerated degradation in munition 
expenditure efficiency.  However, if the intent is to 
increase the current capability, the area of information 
timeliness should be a research and development priority 
since this analysis suggests a small increase in this 
factor level translates into accelerated improvement in 
munition expenditure efficiency.    
c. Correlation and R-Square Contribution 
As mentioned earlier, the polynomial regression 
model accounts for 73% of the variability in the MCSKM 
output based on the R-Square value.  If we look at the 
component breakdown of this 73% by how much each term in 
the regression equation contributes, we can obtain an 
indication of the relative importance of timeliness, 
accuracy, and completeness.  
In a designed experiment like this one, the 
coefficients of the terms in the regression model will be 
uncorrelated (as displayed in figure 11).  Therefore, we 
can actually compute the specific amount of the total R-
Square value for which each term is responsible.20   
                     
20 Neter 
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The first step is to compute the correlation of 
munitions expended with every other term in the model.  
This can be done by extracting the last row of the 
correlation matrix produced by Excel: 
 
Figure 12.   Correlation Matrix of Regression Model 
Inputs 
 
The square of the correlation between Munitions 
and each term in the regression model becomes that term’s 
component contribution to the total R-Square.  Table 16 and 
figure 13 below summarize this relationship: 
 
Table 16.   Component Contribution to Total R-Square 
 
 






Regression Input: Completeness Accuracy Timeliness C2 A2 T2 CA CT AT
Correlation with Munitions: -0.5544 -0.4764 -0.3392 0.0522 0.0090 -0.1778 0.1292 0.1697 0.0378
R-Square Contribution: 0.3074 0.2270 0.1151 0.0027 0.0001 0.0316 0.0167 0.0288 0.0014
Total R-Square: 0.7308 (sum of above row)
Completeness Accuracy Timeliness C2 A2 T2 CA CT AT Munitions
Completeness 1
Accuracy 0 1
Timeliness 0 0 1
Completeness2 5E-18 -8E-18 -4E-19 1
Accuracy2 -8E-18 -8E-18 -4E-19 -3E-18 1
Timeliness2 -4E-19 -4E-19 -4E-19 -2E-17 -2E-17 1
Completeness:Accuracy 0 0 0 -7E-18 -7E-18 5E-19 1
Completeness:Timeliness 0 0 0 5E-19 5E-19 5E-19 0 1
Accuracy:Timeliness 0 0 0 5E-19 5E-19 5E-19 0 0 1
Munitions -0.554 -0.476 -0.339 0.052 0.009 -0.178 0.129 0.170 0.038 1


















Figure 13.   Regression Term R-Square Contribution 
Chart 
 
Table 17 below displays the percentage of the 
total R-Square for which each term is responsible.  The 
term that explains the most variability in the number of 
munitions fired is completeness at 42%.  Accuracy and 
timeliness follow at 31% and 16% respectively.  
[Timeliness]2 as well as the two interactions of 
completeness:accuracy and completeness:timeliness explain 
roughly 2-4% of the variability each.  
  































Regression Input: Completeness Accuracy Timeliness C2 A2 T2 CA CT AT
R-Square Contribution: 0.3074 0.2270 0.1151 0.0027 0.0001 0.0316 0.0167 0.0288 0.0014
Percentage of Total R-Square: 42.06% 31.06% 15.75% 0.37% 0.01% 4.32% 2.28% 3.94% 0.20%
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3.  Summary 
The analysis above of the MCSKM output shows several 
things.  From the analysis of variance it can be seen that 
the three factors of timeliness, accuracy and completeness 
as well as their two-way interactions are significant.  In 
other words, each factor has a unique impact on the number 
of munitions fired.  No two factors are interchangeable. 
Building a complete second order regression model that 
fits the MCSKM output reasonably well provides a framework 
to look at the relative significance of the terms used to 
build the model.  The coefficients on the squared terms 
provide an indication of the linearity of the three 
factors.  The size of the coefficient on the squared term 
provides an indication of the degree of non-linearity that 
exists with regards to that factor.  The sign of the 
coefficient is an indicator of which direction of travel 
from the medium setting provides the bigger change in the 
number of munitions.  A positive sign on the coefficient of 
the squared term indicates that the number of rounds 
changes more as the level of the main factor goes down.  A 
negative sign on the coefficient of the squared term 
indicates that the number of rounds changes more as the 
level of the main factor goes up. 
The regression model also indicates there exists a 
beneficial timeliness:accuracy interaction when each of 
these factors is set at its high level.  Figure 14 below 
demonstrates that the model’s top three predictions all 
occur when timeliness = accuracy = +1.  
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Figure 14.   Regression Model Top Predictions 
 
 A beneficial timeliness:accuracy interaction is 
further evidenced by the fact that three of the top five 
MOE values resulting from the actual simulation runs (refer 
back to table 10) are at design points 1, 10, and 19, where 
timeliness and accuracy are each at their high level.  
Therefore, while at their high levels, the interaction of 
timeliness and accuracy negates the contribution of 
completeness. 
Finally, the correlation of Munitions to the other 
terms in the regression equation provides a way to get at 
the component pieces of the total R-Square value.  This 
gives a good indication of the impact of each term’s 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS  
A.  INFORMATION QUALITY COMPONENT IMPACT 
The goal of this thesis was to draw some broad 
conclusions about how the individual components of 
information quality can influence combat outcomes.  It 
turns out that information timeliness, accuracy and 
completeness each have a distinctive and significant impact 
on the results of a combat scenario.     
1.  Simulation Results Implications 
In this scenario we were able to see that varying the 
levels of these components affect the number of munitions 
required to kill a given percentage of enemy targets.  
Although the output of the MCSKM is heavily dependent upon 
the scenario, the MOE, and input data, we discovered that 
that the individual effect of timeliness, accuracy and 
completeness may not be linear.  Knowing where and how to 
achieve an accelerated return based on an incremental 
change to any of these components is important.  We also 
discovered in this analysis that there are significant 
synergistic effects that take place between information 
components.  Knowing that the combined effects of two of 
these components can overshadow the effect of the remaining 
component is important as well.    
The dynamic relationship among information quality 
components that emerged from this analysis is likely to 
exist in virtually any given scenario and the particulars 
of that relationship will be unique to that scenario.  This 
information in the hands of a concept developer allows him 
to make wise choices in determining what technologies and 
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tactics are needed to improve the success of units 
optimized for specific missions.         
2.   Insights Gained from Preliminary Experimentation 
Although the MCSKM has the ability to represent a wide 
variety of parameters, many were held fixed in this 
analysis.  The fact that many of the parameters were not 
varied suggests much future work that will be addressed in 
the next section.  However, below are just a few insights 
gained from trial and error: 
a. Magnification of Small Performance Errors  
With a probability of false detection and a 
probability of detection being varied as part of the 
accuracy component, the round counts were ranging from 
approximately 300 with factors at the high levels to 14,000 
with factors at the low levels.  The UAV can make a false 
detection at every glimpse.  In the course of an entire run 
of a scenario there are so many glimpses that even if the 
probability of false detection is as small as .01 there 
could be hundreds of false detections each resulting in a 
wasted round.   
The probability of detection compounded this 
problem by dragging out the simulation.  If a target was 
present in the grid but not detected, the UAV would pass 
over it and have to randomly come back to it at a later 
time.  By the time the UAV comes back to the target it has 
had numerous opportunities to make false detections, 
misclassify dead or decoy targets as live, and waste more 
rounds. 
The attrition level was yet another contributor 
to the problem.  After the majority of the live targets are 
  45 
found and killed, the UAV has to keep looking for the last 
few live targets and spends a lot of time wasting rounds in 
the meantime. 
In order to keep the number of munitions at a 
reasonable level, reduction of the complexity of the 
accuracy component was necessary.  This was achieved by 
taking the effect of false targets and the probability of 
detection out of the scenario.  The probability of 
classification alone produced more interpretable results.   
After the accuracy component was brought under 
control, the attrition level was less influential in high 
round counts.  However, keeping the attrition level at 80% 
provided a stopping criteria that allowed the simulation to 
run in a reasonable amount of time (which is important for 
multiple runs).  The scenario chosen for this analysis 
suggested the 80% attrition factor.   
The insight gained from all of this was that 
imperfect information results in substantial inefficiencies 
in destroying targets and even small performance errors 
become magnified over the course of a lengthy engagement. 
b.   Completeness of Information Depends on Time 
Initially the completeness component of 
information was modeled strictly by the size of the grid 
square representing the footprint of the UAV’s sensor.  
However, the results from these simulation runs did not 
make much intuitive sense.  It became apparent that a UAV 
could look at four 100m by 100m grid squares in the same 
amount of time it could look at one 200m by 200m grid 
square.  This happened because the UAV traveled at a fixed 
speed and the time in the grid square was adjusted at each 
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completeness level to account for this.  In other words, 
for any given block of time the same amount of area on the 
ground was potentially covered regardless of the 
completeness setting.   
As a reminder, completeness describes the level 
to which all the relevant items of information are 
available.  Since target information was the relevant item 
in this scenario, the piece of information that contained 
data on the most number of targets was the most complete.  
To model completeness more appropriately, the levels were 
redefined so that time in the grid square was held fixed 
and the size of the grid square changed.  This required UAV 
speed (which was previously held constant) to vary in 
conjunction with the grid size. 
B.  FUTURE STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A more comprehensive understanding of the impact of 
information on combat outcomes requires further research in 
several areas.  Some logical ways to proceed from this 
research are listed below. 
1. Refine the Parameters Associated with Timeliness, 
Accuracy and Completeness 
It was difficult to come up with just the right way to 
model the components of information quality.  There are 
other variables that could be associated with each 
component.  Choosing these variables, as well as the 
appropriate levels for each, and then relating them the 
proper way would improve the quality of the response and 
provide further insights into the dynamics of how these 
information quality components relate to each other and to 
the combat outcome. 
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2. Apply Analysis Framework to Other Scenarios 
The MCSKM is adaptable to explore many other 
scenarios.  This can be done by modifying the objective 
area size and shape, number of UAVs used, distributions 
used for the varying parameters, number and types of 
targets, and input values for parameters.  Scenarios could 
be compared with one another to make observations about how 
the relationship among timeliness, accuracy and 
completeness may differ.   
3. Multiple UAV Types 
Although the MCSKM is currently capable of portraying 
a variable number of UAVs, they all have the same 
characteristics.  Modifying the MCSKM to allow for multiple 
types of UAVs would facilitate the exploration of a wider 
variety of scenarios and provide interoperability with 
existing and future sensor mix optimization models. 
4. Complementary Study on the Value of Information 
Information can be broken down into two attributes: 
value and quality.  The focus of this thesis was on 
information quality in terms of timeliness, accuracy and 
completeness.  A study on the value of information would 
provide additional insights into how information affects 
combat outcomes and, combined with this study, provide a 
more consummate interpretation of the overall impact of 
information. 
5. Spreadsheet Version of MCSKM 
Although the MCSKM is written in Java as a discrete-
event simulation, a spreadsheet implementation of the basic 
concepts behind the MCSKM does exist.  The spreadsheet 
version provides an easier and more familiar environment 
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for anyone interested in examining the underlying 
relationships in the MCSKM.  However, the spreadsheet 
version in its current state lacks several parameters found 
in the MCSKM and is not generalized enough to make it 
extensible for other scenarios.   
The Java source code for the MCSKM and the Excel file 
containing the spreadsheet implementation discussed above 
are both available by contacting MAJ Joseph Baird, United 
States Military Academy, Department of Mathematical 
Sciences, West Point, New York.    
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